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Internet of Things (IoT) 
◆  The next big thing is small 
–  Low-power Motes (TI MSP430, SensorTAG, 
STM32xx, ARM-based, …) 
–  Arduino, Raspberry PI, Intel Quark SoC 
–  Motes with energy harvesting 
◆  IoT is one of the hot research topics, IETF is 
working on IoT protocols 
◆  IoE (Internet of Everything) is coming soon for 
connecting People, Process, Data, and Things 
Source: extremeTech.com  
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IoT:	Different	definitions,	similar	concepts
2      Stephan Haller, Stamatis Karnouskos, Christoph Schroth 
2 The Internet of Things and the Future Internet 
There are currently many terms flying around when trying to characterise the future 
development of the Internet: In addition to the Internet of Things, there is the Internet 
of Services, 3D Internet, Internet of Content, and Next-Generation Networks, just to 
name a few. It is important to note that these terms should not be regarded as different 
“Internets” that will exist in parallel, but rather as different aspects of a common 
Future Internet. The European Commission has understood this and is therefore 
taking concerted action and clustering the research projects it is funding in the 7th 
Framework Programme into what it calls the Future Internet Assembly. Furthermore, 
collaborations are on-going and likely will be intensified with similar efforts in the 
USA and Japan.  
From an enterprise and economic perspective, the Future Internet is the basis for a 
web-based service economy [1]. There will be service platforms and a multitude of 
services available over the Internet, hence the term Internet of Services. The 
granularity of these services will be very different, ranging from high-level business 
services to low-level sensor services provided by the Internet of Things. The role of 
the Internet of Things is to bridge the gap between the physical world and its 
representation in information systems. This leads us to our definition of the Internet of 
Things: 
 
“A world where physical objects are seamlessly integrated into 
the information network, and where the physical objects can 
become active participants in business processes. Services are 
available to interact with these „smart objects„ over the Internet, 
query their state and any information associated with them, 
taking into account security and privacy issues.” 
 
It is noteworthy that in this definition, we don‟t talk about technologies. RFID, sensor 
networks, embedded systems etc. are just enabling technologies, and we will see the 
technologies change over the years, but the main concept behind the Internet of 
Things will remain. Furthermore, the objects can be passive, as is the case with RFID-
tagged objects, or active as in the case of machines with embedded process logic. Key 
is though the seamless integration into the business processes. 
 3 The Business Value of the Internet of Things 
For the Internet of Things to become reality and not just stay at the buzz-word and 
concept level, investments will be needed: to solve current research challenges, to 
develop the necessary hard- and software, and to deploy the infrastructure required. 
This will only happen if there is a clear economic benefit. We see two major 
paradigms from which business value can be derived, which we term real-world 
visibility and business process decomposition. In the following, we define and explain 
both these terms before looking at some of the application areas that stand to profit 




Different Definitions, Similar Concepts 
Despite the global buzz around the Internet of Things, there is no single, universally accepted definition for 
the term. Different definitions are used by various groups to describe or promote a particular view of what 
IoT means and its most important attributes. Some definitions specify the concept of the Internet or the 
Internet Protocol (IP), while others, perhaps surprisingly, do not. For example, consider the following 
definitions. 
 
The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) begins RFC 7452,33 “Architectural Considerations in Smart Object 
Networking’’, with this description: 
The term "Internet of Things" (IoT) denotes a trend where a large number of embedded devices 
employ communication services offered by the Internet protocols.  Many of these devices, often 
called "smart objects,’’ are not directly operated by humans, but exist as components in buildings or 
vehicles, or are spread out in the environment. 
Within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the term “smart object networking” is commonly used in 
reference to the Internet of Things. In this context, “smart objects” are devices that typically have significant 
constraints, such as limited power, emory, and processing resources, or bandwidth.34 Work in the IETF is 
organized around specific requirements to achieve network interoperability between several types of smart 
objects.35  
Published in 2012, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) ITU–T Recommendation Y.2060, 
Overview of the Internet of things,36 discusses the concept of int rconnectivity, but does not specifically tie 
the IoT to the Internet: 
3.2.2 Internet of things (IoT): A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced 
services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving 
interoperable information and commu ication technologies. 
Note 1—Through the exploitation of identification, data capture, processing and communication 
capabilities, the IoT makes full use of things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst 
ensuring that security nd priv cy requirements are fulfilled. 
Note 2—From a broader perspective, the IoT can be perceived as a vision with technological and 
societal implications. 
                                            
33 RFC 7452, “Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking” (March 2015), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7452 
34 Thaler, Dave, Hannes Tschofenig, and Mary Barnes. "Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking." IETF 92 Technical 
Plenary - IAB RFC 7452. 6 Sept. 2015. Web. https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-iab-techplenary-2.pdf 
35 "Int Area Wiki - Internet-of-Things Directorate." IOTDirWiki. IETF, n.d. Web. 06 Sept. 2015. 
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/int/trac/wiki/IOTDirWiki 





This definition in a call for papers for a feature topic issue of IEEE Communications Magazine37 links the IoT 
back to cloud services:  
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a framework in which all things have a representation and a 
presence in the Internet. More specifically, the Int net of Things aims at offering n w applications 
and services bridgi g the physical and virtual worlds, in which Machine-to-Machine (M2M) 
communications represents the baseline communication that enables the interactions between 
Things and applications in the cloud. 
The Oxford Di tionaries38 offers a concise definition that invokes the Internet as an element of the IoT:  
Internet of things (noun): The i terconnection via the Internet f comput ng devices embedded in 
everyday objects, enabling them to send and receive data. 
All of the definitions describe scenarios in which network connectivity and computing capability extends to a 
constellation of objects, devices, sensors, and everyday items that are not ordinarily considered to be 
“computers’’; this allows the devices to generate, exchange, and consume data, often with minimal human 
intervention. The various definitions of IoT do not necessarily disagree – rather they emphasize different 
aspects of the IoT phenomenon from different focal points and use cases.  
However, the disparate definitions could be a source of confusion in dialogue on IoT issues, particularly in 
discussions between stakeholder groups or industry segments.  Similar confusion was experienced in recent 
years abou  net neutrality and cloud c mputing, where different int rpretations of the ter s sometimes 
presented obstacles to dialogue. Whil  it is probably unnecessary to develop a single definition of IoT, it 
should be recognized that there ar  different persp ctives to be factored into discussions. 
For the purposes of this paper, the terms “Internet of Things” and “IoT” refer broadly to the extension of 
network connectivity and computing capability to objects, devices, sensors, and items not ordinarily 
considered to be computers. These “smart objects” require minimal human intervention to generate, 
exchange, and consume data; they often feature connectivity to remote data collection, analysis, and 
management capabilities.  
Networking and communications models for smart objects include those where exchanged data does not 
traverse the Internet r an IP-bas d network. We includ  those m dels in our broad description f “Internet 
of Things” us d for this paper. We do so as it is likely h  the data ge erated or processed from those smart 
objects will ultimately pass through gateways with connectivity to IP-based networks or will otherwise be 
incorporated into product features that are accessible via the Internet. Furthermore, users of IoT devices are 
likely to be more concerned with the services delivered and the implication of using those services than 
issues of when or where data passes through an IP-based network. 
 
                                            
37 http://www.comsoc.org/commag/cfp/internet-thingsm2m-research-standards-next-steps 
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A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues in
Internet-of-Things
Yuchen Yang, Longfei Wu, Guisheng Yin, Lijie Li⇤, and Hongbin Zhao
Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) are everywhere in our daily
life. They are used in our homes, in hospitals, deployed outside to
control and report the changes in environment, prevent fires, and
many more beneficial functionality. However, all those benefits
can come of huge risks of privacy loss and security issues. To
secure the IoT devices, many research works have been conducted
to countermeasure those problems and find a better way to
eliminate those risks, or at least minimize their effects on the
user’s privacy and security requirements. The survey consists of
four segments. The first segment will explore the most relevant
limitations of IoT devices and their solutions. The second one will
present the classification of IoT attacks. The next segment will
focus on the mechanisms and architectures for authentication
and access control. The last segment will analyze the security
issues in different layers.
Index Terms—Internet of Things; Security; Privacy; Survey
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET OF THINGS (IoT) is a collection of “things”embedded with electronics, software, sensors, actuators,
and connected via the Internet to collect and exchange data
with each other. The IoT devices are equipped with sensors
and processing power that enable them to be deployed in many
environments. Figure 1 presents a variety of common IoT
applications, including smart home, smart city, smart grids,
medical and healthcare equipment, connected vehicles, etc.
The fast growth of the number of IoT devices utilized is
predicted to reach 41 billion in 2020 with an $8.9 trillion
market [1] as stated in the 2013 report of the International
Data Corporation (IDC). The difference between IoT and the
traditional Internet is the absence of Human role. The IoT
devices can create information about individual’s behaviors,
analyze it, and take action [2]. Services provided by IoT
applications offer a great benefit for human’s life, but they
can come with a huge price considering the person’s privacy
and security protection.
Because the IoT manufacturers failed to implement a robust
security system in the devices, security experts have warned
the potential risk of large numbers of unsecured devices con-
necting to the Internet [3]. In December of 2013, a researcher
at Proofpoint, an enterprise security firm, discovered the first
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Fig. 1. Internet-of-Things Applications
IoT botnet. According to Proofpoint, more than 25 percent
of the botnet was made up of devices other than computers,
including smart TVs, baby monitors and other household
appliances. Recently, Dyn, a Manchester, New Hampshire-
based provider of domain name services, experienced service
outages as a result of what appeared to be well coordinated
attack [4]. On October 21st, 2016, many websites including:
Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, Airbnb, Reddit, Etsy, SoundCloud
and The New York Times, were reported inaccessible by users
caused by a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) attack
using a network of consumer devices from the Internet of
Things (IoT).
Security and privacy remain huge issues for IoT devices,
which introduce a whole new degree of online privacy con-
cerns for consumers. That’s because these devices not only
collect personal information like users’ names and telephone
numbers, but can also monitor user activities (e.g., when users
are in their houses and what they had for lunch). Following the
never-ending string of disclosures about major data breaches,
consumers are wary of placing too much personal data in
public or private clouds, with good reason [5].
There are many published surveys on IoT security issues and
challenges. Granjal et al. [6] analyzed existing solutions for
the IoT standardized communication protocols (PHY, MAC,
Network, Application) and cross-layer mechanisms whenever
applicable. Sicari et al. [7] presented research challenges and
the current solutions in the field of IoT security focusing on the
main security issues which were identified in seven categories:
authentication, access control, confidentiality, privacy, trust,
secure middleware, mobile security, and policy enforcement.
Consumer	IoT devices
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Bluetooth (BLE) Mesh
• Bluetooth Smart Mesh networking
– Faster speeds, longer range announced
• Exhibitors
– Jasco #9005
• Avi-on lighting ecosystem
• Also a leader in Z-Wave & ZigBee w/ GE-branded lighting and 
appliance controls. ZigBee brand is EZ ZigBee. 
– Ilumi #71334
• Smart bulbs (next slide)
– Gooee #70342
• IoT platform for lighting
– CEL #70957
• 802.15.4: ZigBee, Thread, and Bluetooth
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Smart Lights
LIGHTS
• BeON #21000 (Z-Wave)







– New Sengled Voice (microphone/speaker)
• voice control of devices
• Voice communications
• Audio analytics - glass breaking and baby crying
– Snap (camera)
– BOOST (Wi-Fi extender)
– Pulse (multiroom audio)
– ‘
READ: Sengled Puts Voice-Controlled 
Home Automation in a Smart Bulb
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• Glue #70332
• Danalock (PolyControl) #21000 
– NEW $149 price
– NEW BLE Danapad
• Lockitron (Apigy) #80932
– NEW again - back in crowdfunding with Bolt
– NEW – abandons Wi-Fi locks for BLE 
• Yale #21000 Z-Wave, #70560 Thread
– NEW Linus Lock with Nest Weave
• Kwikset #70523
• August - door lock + N`EW doorbell cam VP
• LockState #71157
– Last of the Wi-Fi locks? 
• Schlage (Allegion) #71525 (iDevices)
– New BLE Locks: Sense Deadbolt, Schlage
Control for multi-unit
• M2M Key Corp #71057
– Really M2M? Not sure …
• SecuRAM #71353
– NEW Genesis Touch biometric lock
– Home automation connectivity, but how?
– “Finger vein ID” technology
Lockitron Bolt 





“M2M cellular” door 
locks – not too sure if 
it’s really M2M 
cellular or just 
standard network
Locks
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Naran – MicroBot, Prota OS #80760
“Microbot Push is 
a wireless robotic 
finger that can 
push most 
ordinary buttons 
just like a human 
finger does.”Microbot Push
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Sensibo #81255
• Makes IR air con itioners smart
• Hub + Pods 
• Learns and adapts
• IFTTT





– Piezo-electric disc (senses fan level of AC in room units)
– Light (for activation of night mode)
– 6 IR emitters
– IR receiver (pass-through for existing remotes)
DUMB - SMART
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Pro-Centric Exhibitors
• Traditional Pro-Oriented Control
– Control4 – New integration with Livio (#4230) from Ford Motor - Renaissance
– Savant – New $499 Savant Remote for DIY #71337
– Leviton (HAI, Bitwise) #21000 (Z-Wave)
– Lutron - New Lutron Connect Gateway for Radio Ra and Homeworks QS, New ZigBe  keypad #70960
– Nortek (Elan, 2Gig) #70936
– Universal Remote Control (URC Total Control)
– Legrand (OnQ, Vantage) - New Intuity system for mainstream + New Eliot IoT ecosystem? #71125
– Powerhouse Alliance (custom distributor with multiple lines of home automation) #20836
• Security-centric
– Resolution Products (Helix) –at Z-Wave, Thread booth and #30-329
– Tyco (DSC, Qolsys) #71557
– Interlogix (UTC)  - with Carrier, Kidde #70358
– Nortek (2Gig) - also at Thread, Z-Wave
– Honeywell - New Lyric system #70931
• Service Providers
– ADT – Pulse system, new LG product
Next-Gen Home TV (NGHTV) - NGHTV 
SmartHome 3.0 is a full-scale demo home in the 
Smart Home marketplace at sands. It features 
elements from custom-centric brands:
• URC Total Control home automation & A/V
• Lilin video surveillance
• Luxul enterprise-grade networking
• Denon Heos
• DynaQuip water system
#71318
Lutron ZigBee Wireless Keypads 
works with Cree and GE Bulbs
DOWNLOAD GUIDE FOR LINKS
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Scent Diffusers
• SensorWake #80541 
– Alarm clock - Wake to scent of coffee, peaches, 
beach, mint or money
• P&G Febreze IoT scent diffuser #70560 (Thread Group)
Includes t mperature and humidity sensor
• Lumiere #81750
– “world’s first smart essential oil diffuser” with “plug-and-
play capsules”
– “Analyses your profile to perfectly match your schedule, 
mood and pains. Tell it how you feel, and it will do the 
rest!”
• Aroma Therapeutics - AromaCare #80941
– “First Diffuser of essential oils connected”
• Beewi #31154
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Flic #80342
• Link a button press to functions on your mobile phone, 
e.g., take picture, ring phone, place a call.
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Nest
• Nowhere and everywhere at CES – No booth
– Thread Group
– ‘Works with Nest’ partners
– ‘Just like Nest’ but …
– Nest Weave
• Yale Linus lock






If your Nest Thermostat notices you’re away, it can tell Whirlpool to 
keep your clothes fresh and wrinkle-free. And if you're home, it can 
automatically switch to Quiet Mode.
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Who Named That?
• SmartyPans (smart cooking pans) #80662
• LoveHandle (Phone grips) #81131
• Go Commando (marketing service) #81132
• 3 Legged Thing (Tripods) #12045
• Smart Me Up #80738
– Real-time face analysis
– Powers Photomaton, Netatmo, Inovallee
SmartyPans
LoveHandle
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• martyPans (smart cooking pans) #80662
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• Smart Me Up #80738
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Fig. 4. The IoT elements.
a big fraction of the time and energy of the device to communi-
cate with other devices and integrate the required services.
In the five-layer model, the Application Layer is the interface
by which end-users can interact with a device and query for inter-
esting data. It also provides an interface to the Business Layer
where high-level analysis and reports can be produced. The
control mechanisms of accessing data in the application layer
are also handled at this layer. This layer is hosted on powerful
devices due to its complex and enormous computational needs.
Considering these points on the one hand and sticking to the
simplicity of the architecture on the other hand, the five-layer
architecture is the most applicable model for IoT applications.
IV. IoT ELEMENTS
Understanding the IoT building blocks helps to gain a better
insight into the real meaning and functionality of the IoT. In
the following sections we discuss six main elements needed
to deliver the functionality of the IoT as illustrated in Fig. 4.
Table II shows the categories of these elements and examples
of each category.
A. Identification
Identification is crucial for the IoT to name and match
services with their demand. Many identification methods are
available for the IoT such as electronic product codes (EPC) and
ubiquitous codes (uCode) [21]. Furthermore, addressing the
IoT objects is critical to differentiate between object ID and its
address. Object ID refers to its name such as “T1” for a particu-
lar temperature sensor and object’s address refers to its address
within a communications network. In addition, addressing
methods of IoT objects include IPv6 and IPv4. 6LoWPAN [22],
[23] provides a compression mechanism over IPv6 headers
that makes IPv6 addressing appropriate for low power wireless
networks. Distinguishing between object’s identification and
address is imperative since identification methods are not glob-
ally unique, so addressing assists to uniquely identify objects.
In addition, objects within the network might use public IPs
and not private ones. Identification methods are used to provide
a clear identity for each object within the network.
B. Sensing
The IoT sensing means gathering data from related objects
within the network and sending it back to a data warehouse,
database, or cloud. The collected data is analyzed to take speci-
fic actions based on required services. The IoT sensors can be
smart sensors, actuators or wearable sensing devices. For exam-
ple, companies like Wemo, revolv and SmartThings offer smart
hubs and mobile applications that enable people to monitor
and control thousands of smart devices and appliances inside
buildings using their smartphones [24]–[26].
Single Board Computers (SBCs) integrated with sensors and
built-in TCP/IP and security functionalities are typically used
to realize IoT products (e.g., Arduino Yun, Raspberry PI, Bea-
gleBone Black, etc.). Such devices typically connect to a central
management portal to provide the required data by customers.
C. Communication
The IoT communication technologies connect heterogeneous
objects together to deliver specific smart services. Typically, the
IoT nodes should operate using low power in the presence of
lossy and noisy communication links. Examples of communica-
tion protocols used for the IoT are WiFi, Bluetooth, IEEE
802.15.4, Z-wave, and LTE-Advanced. Some specific communi-
cation technologies are also in use like RFID, Near Field Com-
munication (NFC) and ultra-wide bandwidth (UWB). RFID is
the first technology used to realize the M2M concept (RFID
tag and reader). The RFID tag represents a simple chip or label
attached to provide object’s identity. The RFID reader transmits
a query signal to the tag and receives reflected signal from the
tag, which in turn is passed to the database. The database con-
nects to a processing center to identify objects based on the re-
flected signals within a (10 cm to 200 m) range [27]. RFID tags
can be active, passive or semi-passive/active. Active tags are
powered by battery while passive ones do not need battery.
Semi-passive/active tags use board power when needed.
The NFC protocol works at high frequency band at 13.56 MHz
and supports data rate up to 424 kbps. The applicable range is
up to 10 cm where communication between active readers and
passive tags or two active readers can occur [28]. The UWB com-
munication technology is designed to support communications
within a low range coverage area using low energy and high
bandwidth whose applications to connect sensors have been
increased recently [29].
Another communication technology is WiFi that uses radio
waves to exchange data amongst things within 100 m range
[30]. WiFi allows smart devices to communicate and exchange
information without using a router in some ad hoc configura-
tions. Bluetooth presents a communication technology that is
used to exchange data between devices over short distances using
short-wavelength radio to minimize power consumption [31].
Recently, the Bluetooth special interest group (SIG) produced
Bluetooth 4.1 that provides Bluetooth Low Energy as well as
high-speed and IP connectivity to support IoT [32]. The IEEE
802.15.4 standard specifies both a physical layer and a medium
access control for low power wireless networks targeting reli-
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TABLE I
COMMON OPERATING SYSTEMS USED IN IOT ENVIRONMENTS
LTE (Long-Term Evolution) is originally a standard wireless
communication for high-speed data transfer between mobile
phones based on GSM/UMTS network technologies [34]. It
can cover fast-travelling devices and provide multicasting and
broadcasting services. LTE-A (LTE Adva ced) [35] is a im-
proved version of LTE including bandwidth extension which
supports up to 100 MHz, downlink and uplink spatial multiplex-
ing, extended coverage, higher throughput and lower latencies.
D. Computation
Processing units (e.g., microcontrollers, microprocessors,
SOCs, FPGAs) and software applications represent the “brain”
and the computational ability of the IoT. Various hardware plat-
forms were developed to run IoT applications such as Arduino,
UDOO, FriendlyARM, Intel Galileo, Raspberry PI, Gadgeteer,
BeagleBone, Cubieboard, Z1, WiSense, Mulle, and T-Mote Sky.
Furthermore, many software platforms are utilized to provide
IoT functionalities. Among these platforms, Operating Systems
are vital since they run for the whole activation time of a
device. There are several Re l-Time Operating Systems (RTOS)
that are good candidates for the development of RTOS-based IoT
applications. For instance, the Contiki RTOS has been used
widely in IoT scenarios. Contiki has a simulator called Cooja
which allows researcher and developers to simulate and emulate
IoT and wireless sensor network (WSN) applications [36].
TinyOS [37], LiteOS [38] and Riot OS [39] also offer light
weight OS designed for IoT e vironment . Moreover, some
auto industry leaders with Google established the Open Auto
Alliance (OAA) and are planning to bring new features to the
Android platform to accelerate the adoption of the Internet of
Vehicles (IoV) paradigm [40]. Some features of these operating
systems are compared in Table I.
Cloud Platforms for another important computational part
of the IoT. These platforms provide aciliti s for smart objects
to send t eir data to the cloud, for big data to be processed
in real-time, and eventually for end-users to benefit from the
knowledge extracted from the collected big data. There are a
lot of free and commercial cloud platforms and frameworks
available to host IoT services. Some of these services are
introduced in Section VII-B.
E. Services
Overall, IoT services can b categorized under four classes
[41], [42]: Identity-related Services, Information Aggregation
TABLE II
BUILDING BLOCKS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF THE IOT
Ser ces, Collaborative-Aware Services an Ubiquitous Ser-
vices. Id ntity-related s r ices are the most b sic and impor-
tant services that are used in other types of services. Every
application that needs to bring real world objects to the virtual
world has to identify those objects. Information Aggregation
Services collect and summarize raw sensory measurements
that need to be processed and reported to the IoT application.
Collaborative-Aware Ser ices act on top f I formation Aggre-
gation S rvices and use the obtained data to make decision and
react accordingly. Ubiquitous Services, however, aim to provide
Collaborative-Aware Services anytime they are needed to any-
one who needs them anywhere. With this categorization, we re-
view some applications of the IoT in the following paragraphs.
The ultimate goal of all IoT applications is to reach the level of
ubiquitous services. However, this end is not achievable easily
since th re are a lot of diffic lties and challen es that have to be
addressed. Most of the existing applications provide identity-
related, information aggregation, and collaborative-aware ser-
vices. Smart healthcare and smart grids fall into the information
aggregation category and smart home, smart buildings, intel-
ligent transportation systems (ITS), and industrial automation
are closer to the collaborative-aware category.
Smart home [43] IoT services contribute to enhancing the
personal life-style by making it easier and more convenient to
monitor and operate home appliances and systems (e.g., air con-
ditioner, heating systems, energy consumption meters, etc.) re-
motely. For example, a smart home can automatically close the
windows and lower the blinds of upstairs windows based on the
weather forecast. Smart h mes are requir d to have r gular in-




Figure 3.1 Architecture of a wireless sensor node
Fundamentals of Wireless Sensor Networks: Theory and Practice  
Waltenegus Dargie and Christian Poellabauer © 2010 
46 
Node Architecture
Figure 3.1 Architecture of a wireless sensor node
Fundamentals of Wireless Sensor Networks: Theory and Practice  
Waltenegus Dargie and Christian Poellabauer © 2010 
Microcontroller
6LoWPAN: The Wireless Embedded Internet, Shelby & Bormann 47 
Microcontroller 
•  Main processing units of embedded devices 
•  Special purpose and highly integrated 
–  Integrated RAM, ROM, I/O, peripherals 
–  Extremely good power to performance ratio 
–  Cheap, typically 0.25 - 10.00 USD  
•  Executes programs including embedded system control, 
measurement & communications 
–  Usually time-critical requiring guarantees 
–  Real-time performance a common requirement 
•  Pre-emptive scheduled tasks 




•  Texas Instruments mixed-
signal uC 
•  16-bit RISC 
•  ROM: 1-60 kB 
•  RAM: Up to 10 kB 
•  Analogue 
–  12 bit ADC & DAC 
–  LCD driver 
•  Digital 
–  USART x 2 
–  DMA controller 
–  Timers 
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TABLE I
COMMON OPERATING SYSTEMS USED IN IOT ENVIRONMENTS
LTE (Long-Term Evolution) is originally a standard wireless
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phones based on GSM/UMTS network technologies [34]. It
can cover fast-travelling devices and provide multicasting and
broadcasting services. LTE-A (LTE Advanced) [35] is an im-
proved version of LTE including bandwidth extension which
supports up to 100 MHz, downlink and uplink spatial multiplex-
ing, extended coverage, higher throughput and lower latencies.
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Processing units (e.g., microcontrollers, microprocessors,
SOCs, FPGAs) and software applications represent the “brain”
and the computational ability of the IoT. Various hardware plat-
forms were developed to run IoT applications such as Arduino,
UDOO, FriendlyARM, Intel Galileo, Raspberry PI, Gadgeteer,
BeagleBone, Cubieboard, Z1, WiSense, Mulle, and T-Mote Sky.
Furthermore, many software platforms are utilized to provide
IoT functionalities. Among these platforms, Operating Systems
are vital since they run for the whole activation time of a
device. There are several Real-Time Operating Systems (RTOS)
that are good candidates for the development of RTOS-based IoT
applications. For instance, the Contiki RTOS has been used
widely in IoT scenarios. Contiki has a simulator called Cooja
which allows researcher and developers to simulate and emulate
IoT and wireless sensor network (WSN) applications [36].
TinyOS [37], LiteOS [38] and Riot OS [39] also offer light
weight OS designed for IoT environments. Moreover, some
auto industry leaders with Google established the Open Auto
Alliance (OAA) and are planning to bring new features to the
Android platform to accelerate the adoption of the Internet of
Vehicles (IoV) paradigm [40]. Some features of these operating
systems are compared in Table I.
Cloud Platforms form another important computational part
of the IoT. These platforms provide facilities for smart objects
to send their data to the cloud, for big data to be processed
in real-time, and eventually for end-users to benefit from the
knowledge extracted from the collected big data. There are a
lot of free and commercial cloud platforms and frameworks
available to host IoT services. Some of these services are
introduced in Section VII-B.
E. Services
Overall, IoT services can be categorized under four classes
[41], [42]: Identity-related Services, Information Aggregation
TABLE II
BUILDING BLOCKS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF THE IOT
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application that needs to bring real world objects to the virtual
world has to identify those objects. Information Aggregation
Services collect and summarize raw sensory measurements
that need to be processed and reported to the IoT application.
Collaborative-Aware Services act on top of Information Aggre-
gation Services and use the obtained data to make decision and
react accordingly. Ubiquitous Services, however, aim to provide
Collaborative-Aware Services anytime they are needed to any-
one who needs them anywhere. With this categorization, we re-
view some applications of the IoT in the following paragraphs.
The ultimate goal of all IoT applications is to reach the level of
ubiquitous services. However, this end is not achievable easily
since there are a lot of difficulties and challenges that have to be
addressed. Most of the existing applications provide identity-
related, information aggregation, and collaborative-aware ser-
vices. Smart healthcare and smart grids fall into the information
aggregation category and smart home, smart buildings, intel-
ligent transportation systems (ITS), and industrial automation
are closer to the collaborative-aware category.
Smart home [43] IoT services contribute to enhancing the
personal life-style by making it easier and more convenient to
monitor and operate home appliances and systems (e.g., air con-
ditioner, heating systems, energy consumption meters, etc.) re-
motely. For example, a smart home can automatically close the
windows and lower the blinds of upstairs windows based on the
weather forecast. Smart homes are required to have regular in-






















































































































Internet of Things Communications Models 
From an operational perspective, it is useful to think about how IoT devices connect and communicate in 
terms of their technical communication models. In March 2015, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) 
released a guiding architectural document for networking of smart objects (RFC 7452),39 which outlines a 
framework of four common communication models used by IoT devices. The discussion below presents this 
framework and explains key characteristics of each model in the framework.  
 Device-to-Device Communications   
The device-to-device communication model represents two or more devices that directly connect and 
communicate between one another, rather than through an intermediary application server. These devices 
communicate over many types of networks, including IP networks or the Internet. Often, however these 
devices use protocols like Bluetooth,40  Z-Wave,41 or ZigBee42 to establish direct device-to-device 
communications, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Example of device-to-device communication model. 
 
These device-to-device networks allow devices that adhere to a particular communication protocol to 
communicate and exchange messages to achieve their function. This communication model is commonly 
used in applications like home automation systems, which typically use small data packets of information to 
communicate between devices with relatively low data rate requirements. Residential IoT devices like light 
bulbs, light switches, thermostats, and door locks normally send small amounts of information to each other 
(e.g. a door lock status message or turn on light command) in a home automation scenario.  
This device-to-device communication approach illustrates many of the interoperability challenges discussed 
later in this paper. As an IETF Journal article describes, “these devices often have a direct relationship, they 
usually have built-in security and trust [mechanisms], but they also use device-specific data models that 
                                            
39 Tschofenig, H., et. al., Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking. Tech. no. RFC 7452. Internet Architecture Board, 
Mar. 2015. Web. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7452.txt 
40 See http://www.bluetooth.com  and  http://www.bluetooth.org 
41 See http://www.z-wave.com 


























require redundant development efforts [by device manufacturers]”.43  This means that the device 
manufacturers need to invest in development efforts to implement device-specific data formats rather than 
open approaches that enable use of standard data formats. 
From the user’s point of view, this often means that underlying device-to-device communication protocols 
are not compatible, forcing the user to select a family of devices that employ a common protocol. For 
example, the family of devices using the Z-Wave protocol is not natively compatible with the ZigBee family of 
devices. While these incompatibilities limit user choice to devices within a particular protocol family, the user 
benefits from knowing that products within a particular family tend to communicate well.  
Device-to-Cloud Communications 
In a device-to-cloud communication model, the IoT device connects directly to an Internet cloud service like 
an application service provider to exchange data and control message traffic. This approach frequently takes 
advantage of existing communications mechanisms like traditional wired Ethernet or Wi-Fi connections to 
establish a connection between the device and the IP network, which ultimately connects to the cloud 
service. This is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Device-to-cloud ommu ication model diagram. 
 
This communication model is employed by some popular consumer IoT devices like the Nest Labs Learning 
Thermostat44 and the Samsung SmartTV.45 In the case of the Nest Learning Thermostat, the device 
transmits data to a cloud database where the data can be used to analyze home energy consumption. 
Further, this cloud connection enables the user to obtain remote access to their thermostat via a smartphone 
or Web interface, and it also supports software updates to the thermostat. Similarly with the Samsung 
SmartTV technology, the television uses an Internet connection to transmit user viewing information to 
Samsung for analysis and to enable the interactive voice recognition features of the TV. In these cases, the 
                                            
43 Duffy Marsan, Carolyn. "IAB Releases Guidelines for Internet-of-Things Developers." IETF Journal 11.1 (2015): 6-8. Internet 
Engineering Task Force, July 2015. Web. https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/Journal_11.1.pdf 
44 “Meet the Nest Thermostat | Nest.” Nest Labs. Web. 31 Aug. 2015.  https://nest.com/thermostat/meet-nest-thermostat/ 


































device-to-cloud model adds value to the end user by extending the capabilities of the device beyond its 
native features. 
However, interoperability challenges can arise when attempting to integrate devices made by different 
manufacturers. Frequently, the device and cloud service are from the same vendor.46  If proprietary data 
protocols are used between the device and the cloud service, the device owner or user may be tied to a 
specific cloud service, limiting or preventing the use of alternative service providers. This is commonly 
referred to as “vendor lock-in’’, a term that encompasses other facets of the relationship with the provider 
such as ownership of and access to the data.  At the same time, users can generally have confidence that 
devices designed for the specific platform can be integrated.   
Device-to-Gateway Model 
In the device-to-gat way model, or more typically, the device-to-application-layer gateway (ALG) model, the 
IoT device connects through an ALG service as a conduit to reach a cloud service. In simpler terms, this 
means that there is application software operating on a local gateway device, which acts as an intermediary 
between the device and the cloud service and provides security and other functionality such s data or 
protocol translation. The model is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Device- o-gateway communication odel diagram. 
 
Several forms of this model are found in consumer devices. In many cases, the local gateway device is a 
smartphone running an app to communicate with a device and relay data to a cloud service. This is often the 
                                            
46 Duffy Marsan, Carolyn. "IAB Releases Guidelines for Internet-of-Things Developers." IETF Journal 11.1 (2015): 6-8. Internet 








































architecture supports “the [user’s] desire for granting access to the uploaded sensor data to third parties”.50 
This approach is an extension of the single device-to-cloud communication model, which can lead to data 
silos where “IoT devices upload data only to a single application service provider’’.51 A back-end sharing 
architecture allows the data collected from single IoT device data streams to be aggregated and analyzed. 
For example, a corporate user in charge of an office complex would be interested in consolidating and 
analyzing the energy consumption and utilities data produced by all the IoT sensors and Internet-enabled 
utility systems on the premises. Often in the single device-to-cloud model, the data each IoT sensor or 
system produces sits in a stand-alone data silo. An effective back-end data sharing architecture would allow 
the company to easily access and analyze the data in the cloud produced by the whole spectrum of devices 
in the building.  Also, this kind of architecture facilitates data portability needs.  Effective back-end data-
sharing archite tures allow use s to mov  their data when they switch betw en IoT ervices, breaking down 
traditional data silo barriers. 
The back-end data-sharing model suggests a federated cloud services approach52 or cloud applications 
programmer interfaces (APIs) are needed to achieve interoperability of smart device data hosted in the 
cloud.53  A graphical representation of this design is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Back-end data sharing model diagram. 
 
                                            
50 Tschofenig, H., et. al., p. 9. 
51 Ibid. 
52 A federated cloud services approach is one that combines the resources of separate cloud service providers to meet a larger 
business need. 
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Wi-Fi Allia ce HaLow MP25556
• NEW Wi-Fi HaLow (802.11ah) – low-rate, low-power 
protocol for IoT
• For battery-operated sensors, wearables, parking meters 
etc.
• “Wi-Fi's answer to Bluetooth”
• 900 MHz
• 2x range of Wi-Fi, improved penetration through walls 
and other obstacles
• More info to come …
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ZigBee Alliance #71344
• ZigBee 3.0 ratified
– All flavors in one
• NEW ZigBee + En cean collaboration
– Self-powered @ 2.4 GHz
– Will combine EnOcean Equipment Profiles (EEPs) with ZigBee 3.0








– OSRAM (Sylvania) – Lightify gateway & ecosystem
– OWON - thermostats
– Philips Hue
– POMCube – Residential energy storage
– Ubisys
– XHY Intelligence Tech.
CES 2015 – Enocean +  ZigBee 
Philips Hue Tap, Legrand switches
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Z-Wave Alliance
• Vision
– Sensors, Z-Wave devices
• Nexia
– NEW Doorbell Sensor
• MCO Home 
• PlumChoice
– NEW ConnectedHome Expert service for 
smart-home tech support
• Enerwave
• Oomi by Fantem
– Complete control system (see: hubs)
• Aeon Labs, Aeotec
– Sensors, bulbs, doorbell, smart window 
film, 
• PolyControl, Danalock
– NEW Door lock now $149
• Remotec
• SecureNet
– SHaaS (smart home as a service) with 
Resolution Products
• Locks
– Kwikset , Schlage, Yale
• Nortek Security & Control
– 2Gig, GoControl – complete home 
automation/security systems for pro and 
DIY installation, plus Z-Wave accessories
STANDARDS
NEW
Nortek’s 2Gig GC3 
launches this year
DOWNLOAD GUIDE FOR LINKS
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– Z-Wave #2100, 70426
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– Enocean #70329
– DECT ULE #70527
– Nest Weave (Thread - #70560)
– Proprietary
– Semi-proprietary
• e.g., Lutron ClearConnect
– Pro security sensors 
• e.g. 433 MHz
– Bluetooth, BLE, Mesh
– Wi-Fi, 6LoWPAN
– Thread Group #70560
– Open Internet Consortium VP
• Samsung, Intel …
– Alljoyn/AllSeen #71836 
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ZigBee or Z-Wave for Home Automation?
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Legrand – Eliot #71125, #71836 (AllSeen)
• NEW Legr nd Eliot: Electricity + IoT
• End-to-end framework
• Launched Sept. 2015
• AllSeen, ZigBee
• NFC for install, mainte ance
• Who knew?!
Flocoon Pixel with inductive charging
Legrand push-buttons, connected doorbell
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Table 2. Main characteristics of ZigBee, 6LoWPAN, Z-Wave, BLE and classic Bluetooth. The data of ZigBee, 6LoWPAN and Z-Wave has 
been obtained or adapted from the literature [2]. 
 ZigBee 6LoWPAN (Over 802.15.4) Z-Wave Bluetooth Low Energy Classic Bluetooth 
Physical layer 
RF band (MHz) 868/915/2400 
868/908 (all chips) 
2400 (400  
serie chip) 
2400 2400 
Bit rate (kbps) 20/40/250 
9.6/40 (from 200  
series chip) 200 






Modulation BPSK/BPSK/O-QPSK BFSK GFSK 







FHSS (2 MHz channel 
width) 




−85 or better(2.4 GHz band)−92  
or better(868/915 MHz bands) 
−101 (at 40 kbps) 
≤−70(required) 
−87 to −93 (typical) −90(typical) 
Transmit  
power (dBm) 




TDMA+CSMA/CA (beacon mode)  
and CSMA/CA (beaconless mode) 




64 (max. MAC 
payload in 200  
series chip) 
8 to 47 358 (maximum) 
Error control 16-bit CRC. ACKs (optional) 
8-bit checksum.  
ACKs (optional) 
24-bit CRC. ACKs 
8-bit CRC (header); 16-bit 
CRC and 2/3 FEC  
(payload). ACKs 
Latency (ms) <5 (beaconless mode, at 250 kbps) <39 (at 40 kbps) <3 <100 
Identifiers 
16- and 64-bit MAC 
addresses. 16-bit  
NWK identifiers 
16- and 64-bit MAC 
addresses. 128-bit  
IPv6 addresses 
32-bit (home ID),  
8-bit (node ID) 
48-bit public device 
Bluetooth address or 
random address 
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Table 2. Cont. 
 ZigBee 6LoWPAN (Over 802.15.4) Z-Wave Bluetooth Low Energy Classic Bluetooth 
Device types or roles 
Coordinator, Router  
and End device 
Edge Router, Mesh Node 
(mesh under), Router (route 
over), Host 




Mesh routing, tree 
routing, and source 
routing 
RPL (other protocols  
are not excluded) 
Source routing Not currently supported 
Scatternet (routing 
protocol out of the scope 







255 4 1 
Outside scope of  
Bluetooth specifications 
Security 
Integrity, confidentiality, access control  
(IEEE 802.15.4 security, using 128-bit AES) 
128-bit AES 
encryption (400  
series chip) 










Levels, Service Levels, 
and Authorization.  
Ex algorithms 
Key management Key management currently 
out of scope 
Implementation size 
45–128 kB (ROM),  
2.7–12 kB (RAM) 
24 kB (ROM),  
3.6 kB (RAM) 
32–64 kB (Flash),  
2–16 kB (SRAM) 
~40 kB (ROM),  
~2.5 kB (RAM) 
~100 kB (ROM),  
~30 kB (RAM) 
  Comparison((cont.)([C.(Gomez(et(al.,(MPI(Sensors(journal(2012,(vol12](
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Scatternet (routing 
protocol out of the scope 







255 4 1 
Outside scope of  
Bluetooth specifications 
Security 
Integrity, confidentiality, access control  
(IEEE 802.15.4 security, using 128-bit AES) 
128-bit AES 
encryption (400  
series chip) 










Levels, Service Levels, 
and Authorization.  
Ex algorithms 
Key management Key management currently 
out of scope 
Implementation size 
45–128 kB (ROM),  
2.7–12 kB (RAM) 
24 kB (ROM),  
3.6 kB (RAM) 
32–64 kB (Flash),  
2–16 kB (SRAM) 
~40 kB (ROM),  
~2.5 kB (RAM) 
~100 kB (ROM),  
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2. Background 
2.1 Z-Wave protocol overview 
The Z-Wave protocol is defined in terms of layers. The Physical (PHY) layer controls the behavior of the radio 
transceiver according to the configurations in Table 1. The Medium Access C ntrol (MAC) layer links network 
devices by managing acknowledgements, error checking, and retransmissions. The Logical Link Control (LLC) 
layer provides access to instances of different network protocol stacks (e.g., 6LoWPAN). Between the MAC and 
LLC layers are adaptation layers for handling Mesh Network Routing (NWK), Segmentation and Reassembly 
(SAR), and/or Encryption (ENC). Finally, the Application (APP) layer controls end device behavior. The PHY, MAC, 
and LLC layers are specified by ITU-T G.9959, while the implementation of the APP layer is left to the device 
manufacturer. 
Table 1: Radio configurations (US) 
 Rate 1 (R1) Rate 2 (R2) Rate 3 (R3) 
Data rate 9.6 kbps 40 kbps 100 kbps 
Symbol rate 19.2 kBaud 40 kBaud 100 kBaud 
Center freq 908.42 MHz 908.40 MHz 916 MHz 
Modulation FSK FSK GFSK 
Coding Manchester NRZ NRZ 
Deviation ±20 KHz ±20 KHz ±29 KHz 
A Z-Wave frame, illustrated in Figure 1, is constructed according to the layers previously described. While the 
frame format is slightly different for each radio configuration in Table 1, for brevity this work focuses on the 
general frame format for R2. Additionally, not depicted in Figure 1 are the NWK, SAR, or ENC adaptation layers 
which only appear when those specific adaptations are invoked. 
 
The PHY layer consists of a preamble for symbol synchronization consisting of the binary pattern 01010101 
terminated by a Start of Frame (SOF) delimiter and followed by data passed from the MAC layer as a PHY Service 
Data Unit (PSDU). The MAC layer includes the fields shown in Figure 1. The Home ID is a four-byte unique 
identifier for an instance of a Z-Wave Home Area Network (HAN). The Source ID and Destination ID fields specify 
the Node IDs, a unique device identifier within a Z-Wave HAN, of the sender and receiver. The Frame Control 
field consists of the subfields shown in Table 2. Of particular interest to this work are the Acknowledgement 
Request and the Sequence Number subfields. The Length field represents the byte length of the PSDU. The MAC 
Service Data Unit (MSDU) is the data passed from the LLC layer. Finally, the MAC layer is concluded with an eight-
bit non-correcting Frame Check Sequence (FCS). 
 
Figure 1: Z-Wave layered frame format 
Table 2: Frame control subfields 
 
The LLC layer, also called the Data Link Protocol Data Unit (DLPDU), consists of Command Class and Command 
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Abstract— The Z-Wave wireless communication protocol has 
been widely used in home automation and wireless sensors 
networks. Z-Wave is based on a proprietary design and a sole 
chip vendor. There have been a number of academic and 
practical security researches on home automation systems based 
on ZigBee and X10 protocols, however, no public vulnerability 
research on Z-Wave could be found prior to this work. 
In this paper, we analyze the Z-Wave protocol stack layers and 
design a radio packet capture device and related software named 
Z-Force to intercept Z-Wave communications.  This device 
enables us to decode different layers of the Z-Wave protocol and 
study the implementation of encryption and data origin 
authentication in the application layer. We then present the 
details of a vulnerability discovered using Z-Force tool in AES 
encrypted Z-Wave door locks that can be remotely exploited to 
unlock doors without the knowledge of the encryption keys. 
Index Terms— Z-Wave, Home Automation, Encryption, Data 
Authentication, Protocol Analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Home automation systems provide a centralized control and 
monitoring function for heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning (HVAC), lighting and physical security systems. 
The central control panel and various household devices such 
as security sensors and alarm systems are connected to each 
other to form a mesh network over wireless or wired 
communication links and act as a “sm rt home”. The first 
generation of home automation systems such as X10 used 
existing power lines in the buildings as the communication 
medium, but as well as limited bandwidth, they were 
susceptible to signal loss and electrical interference. Wireless 
home automation systems overcome th se limitations of the 
power line systems and provide easier xpansio  a d 
interconnectivity of different devices. However, as the radio 
packets can be easily intercepted or injected by the attackers, 
protecting the confidentiality and integrity of wireless 
communication is of great importance in these systems. As 
such, security services such as key establishment, encryption, 
frame integrity protection and devic  authentication were 
included in the specifications of open wireless protocols such 
as ZigBee. Although these security services are built on top of 
the recognized cryptographic algorithms such as Advanced 
Encryption Algorithm (AES), successful attacks against them 
have been demonstrated that exploit the implementation 
vulnerabilities or insecure key man gem nt practices [1] [2]. 
Z-Wave protocol developed by Sigma Designs, Inc. 
provides packet encryption, ntegrity pr tection and device 
authentication services and is gaining momentum against 
ZigBee protocol with regards to home automation. This is 
partly due to interoperability of devices and shorter time to 
market on the vendor side. Another benefit is that it is less 
subjected to signal interference compared to the ZigBee 
protocol, which operates on the widely populated 2.4 GHz 
band shared by both Bluetooth and Wi-Fi devices. The 
protocol specification and software development kit (SDK) [4] 
are not open and only available to the device manufacturers 
(OEMs) who have signed an NDA with Sigma Designs. The 
SDK costs between 1500 to 3500 US dollars and the NDA 
prevents OEMs from disclosing the content of the SDK 
publically. The aim of this research is to build a low cost Z-
Wave packet capture and injection tool which facilitates the 
security testing of home automation systems as well as aides 
vulnerability discovery of the Z-wave security products such as 
access control systems and door locks. 
        
II. Z-WAVE PROTOCOL STACK ANALYSIS 
Z-Wave operates in the Industrial, Scientific and Medical 
radio frequency band (ISM). It transmits on 868.42 MHz 
(Europe) and 908.42 MHz (United States) frequencies 
designed for low-bandwidth data communications in embedded 
devices such as security sensors, alarms and home automation 
control panels. An open source implementation of Z-Wave 
protocol stack, open-zwave [4], is available but it does not 
support the security services as of yet.  
 
Figure 1 - Z-Wave protocol layers 
The open-zwave software uses a Z-Wave controller device 
as the radio modem to communicate with the network nodes. 
The controller devices can only manage one Z-Wave network 
at a given time identified by a unique 32 bits Home ID. The 






Fig. 1: Z-Wave/ITU-T G.9959 Protocol Stack. The MAC and
PHY Layers are specified in the ITU-T G.9959 Recommen-
dation whereas the application and routing layer are specific
to vendor implementation.
geographic locations). There are two node types in Z-Wave
networks: control nodes (gateways); and slave nodes. Control
nodes send commands and request updates and slave nodes
responds to commands. As a meshed topology network, slave
nodes also forward commands to other nodes not directly
reachable by the control node. Message forwarding has a hop
limit of 4 nodes and a maximum of 232 nodes are allowed.
To allow for network overlap, each Z-Wave network has
a unique 32-bit Home ID specified in the controller. Z-Wave
networks can have multiple control nodes but only one of them
can be the primary control.
Of note, the Z-Wave protocol supports the Advanced en-
cryption Standard with 128-bit keys. Although supported,
encryption is not required. Implementing encryption is left
up to the vendor who decides if node communication is
sensitive enough to warrant its use. In the low-rate, low-power
WSNs, memory and power are limited, discouraging vendors
from adding features unless necessary [9]. Surveys of similar
protocols have shown that the use of encryption is not universal
[10].
B. Home Automation
Many Home Automation Networks (HANs) consist of wire-
less sensors that exchange control and information messages
[11]. Device types include door locks, security sensors, alarms,
environmental controls, light modules, and motion sensors
(Fig. 2). The user either manages the HAN with a Z-Wave
controller from the home (Fig. 3) or a Z-Wave gateway that
can be managed either locally or globally (Fig. 4).
Managing the Z-Wave HAN locally lessens the features
and span of network control. Being able to only manage the
network from within the home does not provide the user
with the ability to control locks and alarms while beyond
the controller radio frequency transmission range. However,
managing the network through a globally connected gateway
provides the user with the ability to control their network with
a mobile device from anywhere. If a user forgets to lock their
door or arm the alarm system when they leave the house,
she can login to the gateway and configure devices. With this
accessibility comes added vulnerabilities. Not only does the
user have access to their Z-Wave HAN, but anyone that can
compromise their WLAN defense can also garner access.
Fig. 2: Home automation network model: Multiple Z-Wave
devices communicating with each other and controlled by the
Z-Wave gateway.
As reported in [12], 73% of households with Internet access
have a wireless local area network (WLAN). Studies show
that between 45% and 66% of households in the US have
unsecured WLANs [13-14]. Although these studies were not
global, it can be inferred that a large percentage of WLANs are
unsecured. A survey of IEEE 802.15.4 Wireless Personal Area
Networks in ten US cities found similar percentages of unse-
cured networks [10]. Even if secured, there are weaknesses
and proven exploits against wireless protocols [15-17].
C. Related Work
There are published analyses of note that demonstrate the
exploitation of Z-Wave HANs. The authors of [7] develop a
sniffer project known as z-force. Their sniffer consists of two
Texas Instruments CC1110 boards, one transmits and receives,
and custom firmware. Before implementing the sniffer, the
authors conduct an in-depth study of the Z-Wave protocol
and uncover the details of frame encryption and authentication
algorithms. The ver an implementation error used in
Fig. 3: Local gateway access: Users manage their Z-Wave
HAN via their gateway locally. All device control is performed
from inside the home.
Fig. 4: Global gateway access: Users manage their Z-Wave
HAN via their gateway locally or globally. Z-Wave devices
can be controlled using mobile applications or any Internet
connected device.
735
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  Packet: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 de ad be ef 01 51 08 0d 18 25 01 ff 49
 
###[ Gnuradio header ]### 
  proto     = ZWave
  rfu1      = 0
  channel   = 0
  rfu2      = 0
  version   = 0
  preamble  = 0
  rf_psnr   = 0
  extended  = 0
###[ ZWaveReq ]### 
    homeid    = 0xdeadbeef
    src       = 0x1
    routed    = 0L
    ackreq    = 1L
    lowpower  = 0L
    speedmodified= 1L
    headertype= 1L
    reserved_1= 0L
    beam_control= 0L
    reserved_2= 0L
    seqn      = 8L
    length    = 0xd
    dst       = 0x18
    cmd_class = SWITCH_BINARY
    crc       = 0x49
###[ ZWaveSwitchBin ]### 
       cmd       = SET
###[ Raw ]### 
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layer of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. Information hiding is embedding a secret message into another media to 
provide a covert channel. Martins and Guyennet (2010) use this technique to secure the data transfer in WSNs 
preventing an attacker from eavesdropping and identifying sensitive information. The ability to hide information 
in the MAC layer of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol motivates the evaluation of the feasibility of those techniques in 
an ITU-T G.9959-based protocol.  
3. Information hiding in the Z-Wave MAC frame 
In this section, we show the possibility of hiding data in the Z-Wave MAC frame. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, 
the MAC layer supports three frames. The maximum size of the payload in each frame differs depending on the 
data rates end devices use. Although newly released Gen5 Z-Wave devices can operate at rate R3, we will focus 
on identifying positions to hide information in the MAC frame at rates R1 and R2 for singlecast (acknowledgment 
messages are a subset of singlecast) and multicast messages (Figure 3). The maximum packet size at rates R1 
and R2 is 64B. This evaluation represents the most challenging case for information hiding since the payload size 
available to hide information at R1 and R2 are less than half of R3.  
 
Singlecast MAC frames includes the home ID, source ID, frame control, length, and destination ID totalling 9B 
(Figure 2 and 3). A one byte non-correcting frame checksum is used to validate the MAC frame for data rates R1 
and R2 (2B are used for R3). Given our channel configuration, we know that the frame checksum of messages 
supported in our experimental Z-Wave network is one byte. Thus, there are 54B remaining for the MSDU (frame 
payload). A similar calculation can be done to discover the maximum payload length of the multicast frame 
(Figure 3). There are 39B used in the multicast frame excluding the MSDU. Therefore, the MSDU is 25B.  
 
Figure 3: MAC layer frame structure: (a) singlecast frame and (b) multicast frame 
3.1 Space available to hide information 
The MSDU field has a variable length and contains the frame payload information. The length depends on the 
command class being sent to a device in the Z-Wave network. The command class determines the function that 
needs to be performed by a device.  One example is the Basic command class which is supported by all Z-Wave 
devices. The Basic command class uses three commands: SET to turn a device on or off, GET to request a device 
status, and REPORT to respond to a request. 
 
Since we know that all devices, including the controller, will accept messages containing the Basic command 
class (RaZberry Project n.d.), we can determine the length required in the MSDU for the Basic command class 
portion of the payload.  This will allow us to determine available bytes remaining.  
 
The representation of the Basic command class in the MAC frame is 0x20. The byte field following is dependent 
upon the command SET (0x01), GET (0x02), or REPORT (0x03). In either case, the payload length needed to 
support the Basic command class is at least 3B. Since all Z-Wave devices support the Basic command class, an 
attacker can hide up to 51B of data in a singlecast MAC frame and up to 22B in a multicast MAC frame. When 
the Z-Wave transceiver receives a packet, the header and EoF are stripped away as the packet moves up the 
protocol stack.  Once at the application layer, the command class function is executed and the injected bytes 
are ignored.  
4. Z-Wave covert channel-initiated reverse secure shell attack 
This section presents the first information hiding attack in a Z-Wave network. The experiment setup includes the 
target RaZberry Pi on a WLAN backbone and a HP EliteBook 8570w 64-bit with i7-3720QM CPU, Ubuntu 14.04, 
LiClipse 2.2.0.2, USRP and VERT900 3dBi antenna, and the AFIT Sniffer software framework. 
 
Fuller and Ramsey (2015) illustrate the possibility of gaining access to the target Z-Wave gateway. Additionally, 



















Jonathan Fuller et al. 
 
time (our experiment - ten minutes). When re-access to the Z-Wave network is needed, the attacker executes a 
Secure Shell (SSH) server on their machine. Using Scapy-Radio, the attacker crafts a Z-Wave packet containing 
hidden information and transmits the packet to the Z-Wave gateway using a Software-Defined Radio (SDR). To 
ensure the injected packet is accepted by the Z-Wave network, the attacker first captures a Z-Wave packet and 
extracts the home ID using it to construct the packet similar to Figure 4. The attacker follows the ITU-T G.9959 
8-bit checksum algorithm and calculates the checksum before injection.  
 
Figure 4: MAC frame consisting of (a) home ID, (b) source ID, (c) frame control, (e) length, (e) destination ID, (f) 
basic command class, command, and payload, (g) hidden information in MSDU, and (h) checksum 
The key to this attack is locating Z-Wave packets on the gateway controller. The RaZberry Pi keeps a detailed log 
that contains all actions on the Z-Wave network. Once awake, the Python script scans the log file for any injected 
packet containing the hidden information. The injected packet contains a marker [FE FE] in the MSDU (Figure 
4.g). This marker is used because it is unlikely that a standard Z-Wave packet will contain consecutive bytes [FE]. 
Upon identification, the Python script dissects the packet retrieving needed information including the attack 
type [01] and IP ddress [A2-56-C0-05] (Figure 5). Any attack type can be added depending on the needs of the 
attacker. Examples include Ping of Death to deny service or Reverse File Transfer to retrieve the /etc/passwd file 
or other important files. 
 
Figure 5: After the attacker executes a listening server, (a) a malicious Z-Wave packet is injected to the gateway 
using a SDR. When the malware on the infected gateway detects the injected frame, it retrieves the IP 
address and (b) opens a R-SSH. The attacker now has full control of the Z-Wave gateway and access to 
WLAN devices 
After retrieving the hidden information, the Python script clears the log file to cover tracks and initiates a R-SSH 
client to the attack SSH server at IP address 162.86.192.5 (Figure 6 (a) (3)). The attacker can now perform 
command line instructions as root user on the target RaZberry Pi allowing access to Z-Wave devices and WLAN 
devices. Once complete, the attacker simply closes the connection which instructs the Python script to sleep for 
the predetermined time.  
 
Although this attack was conducted within 20 meters of the target location, more than enough distance for an 
attacker to remain inconspicuous, previous works demonstrates the exploitation of WSN devices from 40 miles 
away (Apa and Hollman 2013). Given improved tools, an attacker with this capability need not be in close 
proximity to the target location to inject packets in to the network. 
 
Given this new application of information hiding techniques to Z-Wave networks, we recognize the need for 
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Where is BTLE?
⇀ High end smartphones
⇀ Sports / fitness devices
⇀ Door locks
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PHY Layer
⇀ GFSK, +/- 250 kHz, 1 Mbit/sec
⇀ 40 channels in 2.4 GHz
⇀ Hopping
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Physical Channels
⇀ Advertising:   3 channels
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Hopping
⇀ Hop along 37 data channels
⇀ One data packet per channel
⇀ Next channel  channel + hop increment (mod 37)≡
⇀ Time between hops: hop interval
3 → 10 → 17 → 24 → 31 → 1 → 8 → 15 → …
hop increment = 7
Protocol	stackBLE(protocol(stack(What are the pieces?
AppsApplications = Profiles & Services
Generic Access Profile
Generic Attribute Profile
HostAttribute Protocol Security Manager
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Figure 1. (a) BLE protocol stack; (b) structure of a BLE data unit (note: the size of each 
field is expressed in bytes). 
 
Although some of the BLE Controller features are inherited from the classic Bluetooth Controller, 
both types of Controller are currently incompatible. Hence, a device that only implements BLE (which 
is referred to as a single-mode device) cannot communicate with a device that only implements classic 
Bluetooth. It is expected that many devices will implement both the classic Bluetooth and the BLE 
protocol stacks. These devices are called dual-mode devices. 
2.2. Physical Layer  
BLE operates in the 2.4 GHz Industrial Scientific Medical (ISM) band and defines 40 Radio 
Frequency (RF) channels with 2 MHz channel spacing. There are two types of BLE RF channels: 
advertising channels and data channels. Advertising channels are used for device discovery, 
connection establishment and broadcast transmission, whereas data channels are used for bidirectional 
communication between connected devices. 
Three channels are defined as advertising channels. These channels have been assigned center 
frequencies that minimize overlapping with IEEE 802.11 channels 1, 6 and 11, which are commonly 
used in several countries. 
An adaptive frequency hopping mechanism is used on top of the data channels in order to face 
interference and wireless propagation issues, such as fading and multipath. This mechanism selects one 
of the 37 available data channels for communication during a given time interval. 
All physical channels use a Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying (GFSK) modulation, which is simple 
to implement. The modulation index is in the range between 0.45 and 0.55, which allows reduced peak 
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2.3 Data Packet
The transmitted data from a Bluetooth low energy device is formatted according to the Bluetooth Core
Specification and is comprised by the parts shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Bluetooth Low Energy Data Packet
The Preamble is a 1 byte value used for synchronization and timing estimation at the receiver. It will
always be 0xAA for broadcasted packets. The Access Address is also fixed for broadcasted packets, set
to 0x8E89BED6. The packet payload consists of a header and payload. The header describes the packet
type and the PDU Type defines the purpose of the device. For broadcasting applications, there are three
different PDU Types, as shown in Table 1. ADV_IND and ADV_NONCONN_IND have been described
previously (as connectable and non-connectable) while ADV_SCAN_IND is simply a non-connectable
broadcaster that can provide additional information by scan responses.
Table 1. Advertising PDU Types for Broadcasting Data
PDU Type Packet Name Description
0000 ADV_IND Connectable undirected advertising event
0010 ADV_NONCONN_IND Non-connectable undirected advertising
event
0110 ADV_SCAN_IND Scannable undirected advertising event
The TxAdd bit indicates whether the advertisers address (contained in the Payload) is public (TxAdd = 0)
or random (TxAdd = 1). RxAdd is reserved for other types of packets not covered in this application note,
as it does not apply to beacons.
The final part of the transmitted packet is the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). CRC is an error-detecting
code used to validate the packet for unwanted alterations. It ensures data integrity for all transmitted
packets over the air.
The Payload of the packet includes the advertisers address along with the user defined advertised data as
shown in Figure 2. These fields represent the beacons broadcasted address and data.
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How does it work: advertising
150µS 150µS
ADV_IND ADV_IND SCAN_RSP ADV_IND
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Periph.
SCAN_REQ
Channel 37 Channel 38 Channel 39
Central
Advertising event T_advEvent
Devices can advertise for a variety of reasons:
• To broadcast promiscuously  
• To transmit signed data to a previously bonded device
• To advertise their presence to a device wanting to connect
• To reconnect asynchronously due to a local event       
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Channel 37 Data Channel
en ra
Master
Advertising event Connection event
Once a connection is made:
• Master informs slave of hopping sequence and when to wake
• All subsequent transactions are performed in the 37 data channels
• Transactions can be encrypted
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ATT/GATT (extra)
⇀ Services: groups of characteristics
⇀ Characteristics
⇁ Operations
⇀ Everything identified by UUID
⇁ 128 bit




































The GPS position sent among parameters of this 
request could also be easily spoofed, and therefore 
should not be used as a reliable form of protection. 
 
 
The availability of beacon-mapping sites (for 
example http://wikibeacon.org/map), which allow 
for locating beacon signals in a specific location, 
may make the attack even easier to invoke 
remotely. 
 
4.1.2. Attack countermeasures 
In order to prevent advertisement abuse, beacon 
vendors introduced “shuffling” (also called 
“encrypting”) and signing options for the 
broadcasted values. The advertised packets change 
their values with predefined frequency, and the 
value is possible to “decode” only using the 
vendor's mobile application. However, such 
mechanisms have to overcome several limitations - 
on both the hardware and software side, as well as 
compromise for offline usage requirements. As 
vendors guard the “shuffling” algorithm’s technical 
details in the way of top-secret intellectual 
property, it may rais  conc rns whether the 
mechanism was properly reviewed by a professional 
cryptographer. 
Depending on the level of risk, the ideal solution 
would be to not rely on received advertisement 






















4.2. Passive Interception 
Unencrypted transmission can be intercepted by 
a passive eavesdropper. Bluetooth interception 
does not require sophisticated nor expensive 
hardware any more. There are several affordable 
hardware options which help to accomplish this task, 
including open-sourced Ubertooth by Great Scott 
Gadgets [7]. 
For the purpose of this research, a simple USB 
dongle based on the nRF51822 Nordic BLE module 
was used. At the time of this writing, it was 
available for $29.95 on the producer's website [8]. 
The device comes with software which feeds the 
sniffed packets to the Wireshark network analyzer. 
Interception of transmitted data is also possible by 
active attack, using the newly introduced tool. 
 
4.2.1. Example vulnerabilities 
 
  Smart finder 
A  example “smart find r” device implemented 
authentication in a form of a static 6-digit password 
sent from the mobile application to the device in 
cleartext form characteristic write. A screendump 
below presents the password (‘123456’) intercepted 
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Encryption
⇀ Provided by link layer









BLE	encryptionLE (v4.0) security: encryption
• Pairing (once, in a secure environment)
• JustWorks (R) – most common, devices without display cannot implement 
other
• 6-digit PIN – if the device has a display
• Out of band – not yet spotted in the wild 
• "Just Works and Passkey Entry do not provide any passive 
eavesdropping protection"
• Establish Long Term Key, and store it to secure future communication 
("bonding")
Mike Ryan, https://www.lacklustre.net/bluetooth/
BLE	encryption	in	practiceBLE (v4.0) security in practice
• 8 of 10 tested devices do not implement BLE-layer encryption
• "Forget" to do it, or do not consider clear-text transmission a problem
• The pairing is in OS level, mobile application does not have full control over it
• It is troublesome to manage with requirements for:
• Multiple users/application instances per device
• Access sharing
• Cloud backup
• Public access devices (e.g. cash register)
• Other hardware/software/UX problems with pairing




⇀ Exception: Some vendors implement their own 
security on top of GATT
⇁ Did they talk to a cryptographer?
BLE	security	in	practice
BLE (v4.0) security in practice
• Security in "application" layer (GATT)
• Various authentication schemes
• Static password/key
• Challenge-response (most common)
• PKI
• Own crypto, based usually on AES
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And That's It
⇀ TK → STK
⇀ STK → LTK
⇀ LTK → Session keys









AES(TK, AES(TK, rand XOR p1) XOR p2)
GREEN = we have it  
RED = we want it
TK: integer between 0 and 999,999
























Connect the advertising device (MAC)
Start scanning for advertisements








Keep connection to 
original device. It 
does not advertise 
while connected ;)
Specific advertisement received, 
stop scanning

































[Jasek et	al,	GATTacking bluetooth smart	devices,	Blackhat USA	2016]
Counter-measuresHow to fix the problem?
• Use the BLE security features
• Encryption, bonding, MAC randomization
• Do not allow to bond automatically
• Detect MITM, warn the user
• Your own mechanisms
• Do not implement static passwords
• Design with active interception possibility in mind
• Beware excessive services, misconfiguration
• Prepare fallback for Denial of Service
• ...
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Capteur d’ouverture de porte : Door/Window sensor - Zipato
FIGURE 12: Door/Window sensor - Zipato
Un capteur à fixer sur une porte qui envoit l’information et le signal d’alarme au contrô-
leur dès que celle-ci s’ouvre ou se ferme.
3.1.2 Ressources logicielles
Open-Zwave
Open-Zwave est une librairie open source dédiée aux développeurs souhaitant tester et
incorporer des fonctionnalités Z-Wave à leurs applications. Nous utiliserons cette librairie
avec notre contrôleur USB pour contrôler le réseau Z-Wave.
Voici une impression d’écran d’Open-Zwave Control Panel, une interface graphique
pour Open-Zwave :
FIGURE 13: Open-Zwave Control Panel
Grâce à cette interface, nous pouvons visualiser les nœuds et appareils constituant
notre réseau, et les commander. Par exemple pour la prise Smart Plug, un simple Switch
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2.5 Études existantes
2.5.1 Projet Z-Force
Des études d’analyse ont déjà été publiées, parmi elles le projet Z-Force. Les auteurs
de [6] ont réalisé un outil d’espionnage et d’injection de paquets Z-Wave en utilisant deux
cartes Texas Instruments CC1110 (une en émission et une en réception). Avant l’implé-
mentation de leur logiciel, les auteurs ont menés une étude en profondeur sur le protocole
Z-Wave qui leur à permis de trouver les algorithmes de cryptage utilisés. En l’occurrence
il s’agit d’un chiffrement AES avec une clé variable sur 128 bits. Grâce à leur logiciel, ils
ont pu découvrir une faille dans le système leur permettant de réinitialiser la clé de chif-
frement, et ils ont ainsi étés capables de prendre le contrôle d’une serrure sécurisée en se
faisant passer pour le contrôleur. Depuis, ils ont communiqués la faille à Sygma Designs
qui l’a corrigée Nous ne nous baserons pas sur leur outil, car il n’est pas du tout universel :
il ne fonctionne que dans la bande de fréquence utilisée en Europe, et son contenu n’est
pas de nature open-source, il est donc difficilement implémentable, ou modifiable.
2.6 Projet Scapy-Radio
Une autre analyse du protocole Z-Wave a été menée à travers le projet Scapy-Radio
[3]. Scapy-Radio combine Scapy et gnuRadio pour capturer les paquets circulant sur le
réseau, les analyser et en injecter de nouveaux. Pour tester leur outils, les auteurs ont
créé un réseau Z-Wave en utilisant une carte Raspberry Pi et le contrôleur Aeon Labs Z-
Stick programmé grâce à Open-zwave. Ils ont inclus 2 appareils Z-Wave dans le réseau :
un capteur de mouvement et une alarme. Après plusieurs observations du trafic, ils ont
étés capables de détecter le message d’activation envoyé par le contrôleur vers l’alarme
lorsque le capteur de mouvement était activé, et en conséquence, d’envoyer un message
de désactivation aussitôt. L’attaque a été couronnée de succès et a créé un déni de service.
C’est sur leur travail que nous avons basé notre approche.
3 Notre démarche : expériences et résultats
3.1 Environnement de travail : ressources utilisées
3.1.1 Ressources matérielles
Communicat on radio : la c rte Ettus-USRP B210
FIGURE 9: carte Ettus USRP B210








Étude et Analyse sur la sécurité des objets connectés 15
ON/OFF nous permet de l’allumer ou de l’éteindre. Le control-panel nous permet aussi
d’ajouter de nouveaux appareils dans le réseau ou au contraire d’en supprimer.
On note cependant qu’Open-Zwave ne propose pas de cryptographie, ce qui nous sim-
plifie la tâche pour l’écoute des paquets échangés mais ne correspond pas vraiment à un
cas réel de réseau domotique Z-Wave.
GNU Radio
Pour traiter les signaux reçus par la carte SDR et les transformer en paquets, nous
utilisons GNU Radio sur une machine virtuelle Linux. Ce logiciel est open source et a
l’avantage de présenter une interface graphique ergonomique où il suffit d’assembler des
modules.
En reprenant les travaux des ingénieurs ADS, on réceptionne les paquets Z-Wave avec
ce modèle :
FIGURE 14: Partie réception dans GNU Radio
Le bloc UHD : USRP Source correspond aux signaux réceptionnés par la carte SDR,
que nous avons réglé sur la fréquence Z-Wave (868.4 MHz) avec une fréquence d’échan-
tillonnage de 800kHz. Après plusieurs blocs pour démoduler le signal et le transformer
en bits, puis en paquets, ces paquets sont envoyés dans le bloc Socket PDU qui permet la
communication avec Scapy.
De la même manière, nous envoyons des paquets Z-Wave avec ce modèle :
FIGURE 15: Partie émission dans GNU Radio
Scapy-Radio
Dans la console, on lance Scapy, qui combiné à GNU Radio nous permet de décoder
des paquets Z-Wave et d’en injecter. Les principales commandes utilisées sont :
— sniffradio() : écoute les paquets échangés et les décode en message (requête ou
acquittement)











the three main components on which our tool
is relying to achieve that goal:
• Software Defined Radio;
• GNU Radio;
• Scapy.
2.1 Software Defined Radio
A radio communication system where the
signal-capturing components are software-
configurable and the signal-processing com-
ponents are software-implemented is called a
Software Defined Radio (SDR). This is exactly
what we need in order to be able to capture
and process a broad range of radio signals.
The most notorious opensource-friendly and
affordable computer-hosted SDR boards are
HackRF [6], bladeRF [7] and USRP2 [8]. Because
they are full-duplex, dual-channel and they
offer large radio spectrum capabilities as well
as a great amount of bandwidth, we chose to
work with two USRP B210 boards.
Fig. 1: Ettus USRP B210 board
2.2 GNU Radio
GNU Radio [9] is an opensource software de-
velopment kit that provides a great number of
signal processing blocks to implement SDRs.
It is already widely used with the previously
mentioned SDR boards but it can also act as a
simulation-like environment.
While performance-critical signal-processing
blocks are written using C++, GNU Radio
is designed to write radio applications using
Python. More specifically, radio applications
can be prototyped with a graphical UI, the
GNU Radio Companion (GRC). We are going
to rely on GRC flow graphs to capture signals
and turn them into network packets.
Fig. 2: Example of a GRC flow graph
2.3 Scapy
Scapy [10] is an interactive packet manipula-
tion framework written using Python. It can
capture, decode, forge and inject packets while
matching requests and replies for a broad range
of network protocols. It can also handle vari-
ous network tasks such as probing, scanning,
tracerouting, fuzzing, etc.
Because it gives security auditors the capa-
bilities to quickly prototype new networking
tools without the need to go into the details of
creating raw packets from square one, Scapy is
already widely used by the penetration testing
community. This is exactly what we wanted to
achieve for wireless protocols and that is why
we chose Scapy for protocol dissection and user
interaction.
3 SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
Figure 3 shows how all the previously men-
tioned components interact with each other.
In this section, we talk about the software
development that was necessary to make that
happen.
Scapy 
IN socket OUT socket 
GRC flow graph (GNU Radio) 
OUT socket IN socket 



















Fig. 3: Scapy-radio architecture
https://bitbucket.org/cybertools/scapy-radio/src
Source:	Jean-Michel	Picod et	al,	« Bringing Software	Defined Radio	to	Penetration Testing Community »,	Blackhat 2014
GNU	Radio:	Receiving	Z-Wave	packets
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ON/OFF nous permet de l’allumer ou de l’éteindre. Le control-panel nous permet aussi
d’ajouter de nouveaux appareils dans le réseau ou au contraire d’en supprimer.
On note cependant qu’Open-Zwave ne propose pas de cryptographie, ce qui nous sim-
plifie la tâche pour l’écoute des paquets échangés mais ne correspond pas vraiment à un
cas réel de réseau domotique Z-Wave.
GNU Radio
Pour traiter les signaux reçus par la carte SDR et les transformer en paquets, nous
utilisons GNU Radio sur une machine virtuelle Linux. Ce logiciel est open source et a
l’avantage de présenter une interface graphique ergonomique où il suffit d’assembler des
modules.
En reprenant les travaux des ingénieurs ADS, on réceptionne les paquets Z-Wave avec
ce modèle :
FIGURE 14: Partie réception dans GNU Radio
Le bloc UHD : USRP Source correspond aux signaux réceptionnés par la carte SDR,
que nous avons réglé sur la fréquence Z-Wave (868.4 MHz) avec une fréquence d’échan-
tillonnage de 800kHz. Après plusieurs blocs pour démoduler le signal et le transformer
en bits, puis en paquets, ces paquets sont envoyés dans le bloc Socket PDU qui permet la
communication avec Scapy.
De la même manière, nous envoyons des paquets Z-Wave avec ce modèle :
FIGURE 15: Partie émission dans GNU Radio
Scapy-Radio
Dans la console, on lance Scapy, qui combiné à GNU Radio nous permet de décoder
des paquets Z-Wave et d’en injecter. Les principales commandes utilisées sont :
— sniffradio() : écoute les paquets échangés et les décode en message (requête ou
acquittement)
J.PLANE - N.GAGNAIRE PFE ENSEM: ISA/ISN 3A
GNU	Radio:	sending	Z-Wave	packets
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ON/OFF nous permet de l’allumer ou de l’éteindre. Le control-panel nous permet aussi
d’ajouter de nouveaux appareils dans le réseau ou au contraire d’en supprimer.
On note cependant qu’Open-Zwave ne propose pas de cryptographie, ce qui nous sim-
plifie la tâche pour l’écoute des paquets échangés mais ne correspond pas vraiment à un
cas réel de réseau domotique Z-Wave.
GNU Radio
Pour traiter les signaux reçus par la carte SDR et les transformer en paquets, nous
utilisons GNU Radio sur une machine virtuelle Linux. Ce logiciel est open source et a
l’avantage de présenter une interface graphique ergonomique où il suffit d’assembler des
modules.
En reprenant les travaux des ingénieurs ADS, on réceptionne les paquets Z-Wave avec
ce modèle :
FIGURE 14: Partie réception dans GNU Radio
Le bloc UHD : USRP Source correspond aux signaux réceptionnés par la carte SDR,
que nous avons réglé sur la fréquence Z-Wave (868.4 MHz) avec une fréquence d’échan-
tillonnage de 800kHz. Après plusieurs blocs pour démoduler le signal et le transformer
en bits, puis en paquets, ces paquets sont envoyés dans le bloc Socket PDU qui permet la
communication avec Scapy.
De la même manière, nous envoyons des paquets Z-Wave avec ce modèle :
FIGURE 15: Partie émission dans GNU Radio
Scapy-Radio
Dans la console, on lance Scapy, qui combiné à GNU Radio nous permet de décoder
des paquets Z-Wave et d’en injecter. Les principales commandes utilisées sont :
— sniffradio() : écoute les paquets échangés et les décode en message (requête ou
acquittement)
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Avec les paramètres du brouilleur par défaut, à savoir gain = 60 et amplitude = 200 mV,
le contrôleur et la prise arrivent tout de même à s’échanger des paquets. A une distance
d’environ 1 mètre du contrôleur, et en augmentant l’amplitude du bruit à 700 mV, la
prise ne répond plus aux ordres du contrôleur, l’attaque est réussie. On note qu’il suffit
d’augmenter le gain d’émission lorsqu’on s’éloigne du réseau à brouiller.
Un résultat intéressant est l’exclusion automatique de la prise Smart Plug du réseau
par le contrôleur. En effet, comme le contrôleur n’arrive plus à recevoir les paquets de la
prise, il considère que celle-ci n’est plus opérationnelle et change son statut de « Ready »
à « Dead » comme le montre le control panel :
FIGURE 19: Statut de la prise après brouillage
De ce fait, la prise devient inutilisable même après l’extinction du brouilleur. Il faudra
alors la réinclure manuellement dans le réseau pour la rendre de nouveau utilisable.
Le brouilleur est donc un moyen simple et efficace pour rendre un réseau Z-Wave in-
opérationnel. Nous allons dans la suite nous intéresser à des attaques plus subtiles comme
celle du « Man In the Middle », en analysant les paquets échangés et en essayant d’injecter
des paquets imposteurs.
3.2.2 Attaques réalisées sur la prise Smart Plug
Nous nous intéressons aux paquets échangés entre le contrôleur et la prise lorsque nous
l’allumons via le control panel.
Sur Scapy-Radio, on utilise les commandes sniffradio() et show() comme explicitées
précédemment pour capturer et analyser les paquets.
Nous arrivons à capturer l’échange suivant :
FIGURE 20: Echange capturé
J.PLANE - N.GAGNAIRE PFE ENSEM: ISA/ISN 3A
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p est un tableau de paquets. Pour analyser les deux premiers paquets échangés, on
utilise les command s p[0].show() et p[1].show() :
FIGURE 21: p[0] et p[1]
Grâce à la dissection des paquets par Scapy, on accède aux contenus de ces derniers. On
peut voir l’en-tête rajouté par GNU Radio, on peut également voir s’il s’agit d’une requête
(ZWaveReq) ou d’un acquittement (ZWaveAck). Les données « 0x... » sont codées en
hexadécimale et les données « ...L » sont codées sur 1 à 4 bits et correspondent aux
paramètre des deux octets de contrôle de trame.
Intéressons-nous tout d’abord au paquet p[0], qui correspond à la toute première re-
quête du contrôleur. On peut observer homeid qui correspond à l’ID de notre réseau, src
désigne la source du paquet, seqn correspond au numéro de séquence, length la longueur
du paquet, dst le destinataire, cmd la classe de commande et enfin crc le contrôle de
redondance cyclique (la checksum).
La classe de commande SWITCH_BINARY rajoute un paramètre ZWaveSwitchBin au
paquet, comprenant le type de commande (switchcmd) et la valeur de celle-ci (val).
On en déduit que le premier paquet p[0] est une requête du contrôleur en destination
du nœud n 2 (correspondant à la prise), de type SWITCH et de valeur ON. Le paquet
p[1] correspond à l’acquittement de la prise en destination du contrôleur. Le numéro de
séquence seqn est généré aléatoirement à chaque requête et permet d’associer un acquit-
tement à sa requête.
Analysons les deux paquets suivants :
J.PLANE - N.GAGNAIRE PFE ENSEM: ISA/ISN 3A
Plug	->	controller:	state	notification
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FIGURE 22: p[2] et p[3]
C’est maintenant la prise qui envoie une requête de type STATE et de valeur ON. En
effet, après réception de la requête SWITCH ON, la prise change son état et le renvoie
automatiquement au contrôleur, qui acquitte à son tour (p[3]).
Poursuivons l’analyse des paquets suivants :
FIGURE 23: p[4] et p[5]
On observe ici que le contrôleur envoi une requête de type REQ_STATE à la prise, il
demande en fait à la prise si elle a bien changé son état en ON.
On remarque donc une anomalie de communication entre le contrôleur et la prise,
puisque la prise a déjà communiqué son nouvel état au contrôleur. Nous pensons alors
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How do we sniff it?

















































































- cmake .. -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
- cmake --build .
- cd ../..
- ln -s waving-z/build/wave-in wave-in

































• The	smart	plug	provides	a	Wifi network:	mFI D25CE7
• Connect	your	host	to	this	WiFi network
• Execute	nmap to	find	the	IP	of	the	connected	smart	plug:







• Possible	SSH	connections	with easy to	find login/password
• Dropbear sshd 0.51:	2	vulnerabilities
• Lighttpd 1.4.31:	6	vulnerabilities
• DNS	resolver (port	53):	could be used as	a	DDoS amplifier
• Let’s	connect	to	the	device	using	telnet!!
• Let’s	explore the	file	system
Let’s	explore	network	connections
The	embedded	web	server	private	key
